Do targets of ostracism truthfully communicate their emotional reactions to sources?

Ostracism triggers negative emotions such as sadness, anger, and hurt feelings. Do targets of ostracism truthfully share their emotions with the sources of ostracism? Drawing on past research on social-functional accounts of emotions and interpersonal emotion regulation, we investigated the possibility that targets may misrepresent their emotions (i.e., gaming emotions). We conducted three experiments (N = 1058; two pre-registered) using an online ball-tossing game, in which participants were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized. Consistent with the literature, we found that ostracized individuals were more hurt, sad, and angry than included individuals. However, we found little and inconsistent evidence that ostracized (vs included) individuals misrepresented their emotional reactions to the sources. Further, Bayesian analyses offered more support against misrepresentation of emotions. These findings suggest that targets of ostracism truthfully communicated their social pain to the sources.

Discriminatory punishment undermines the enforcement of group cooperation.

Peer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become ineffective and group cooperation deteriorates. Here we show that this happens in pluriform groups where members have different socio-demographic characteristics. In our public good provision experiment, participants were confronted with a public good from which all group members benefitted equally, and in-between rounds they could punish each other. Groups were uniform (members shared the same academic background) or pluriform (half the members shared the same academic background, and the other half shared another background). We show that punishment effectively enforced cooperation in uniform groups where punishment was conditioned on poor contribution. In pluriform groups, punishment was conditioned on poor contribution too, but also partially on others' social-demographic characteristics-dissimilar others were punished more than similar others regardless of their contribution. As a result, punishment lost its effectiveness in deterring free-riding and maintaining public good provision. Follow-up experiments indicated that such discriminatory punishment was used to demarcate and reinforce subgroup boundaries. This work reveals that peer punishment fails to enforce cooperation in groups with a pluriform structure, which is rule rather than exception in contemporary societies.

Intensity, intent, and ambiguity: Appraisals of workplace ostracism and coping responses.

Using both correlational and experimental designs across four studies (N = 1251 working individuals), the current project aimed to contribute to the understanding of workplace ostracism by studying two research questions. First, we tested whether the subjective experience of targets reflects the current theorizing of ostracism. Second, drawing from the transactional theory of stress and coping, we investigated whether this subjective experience impacts targets' coping responses. Findings based on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported the current theorizing of workplace ostracism such that perceived intensity, intent, and ambiguity were reflected in how targets appraised being ostracized at work. The appraisals were also related to coping responses. Perceived intensity predicted more approach-oriented (e.g., confrontation) and less avoidance-oriented coping responses (e.g., minimization). While attributions of intent also predicted some coping responses (e.g., instrumental support seeking), the explanatory power of perceived ambiguity was lower than the other two appraisals. Although these researcher-defined dimensions may be reflective of targets' experience, we propose that predictions made based on these dimensions need further refinement. The theoretical and practical significance of these findings are discussed in relation to how workplace ostracism is typically studied in the literature.

Ire and punishment: Incidental anger and costly punishment in children, adolescents, and adults.

Why do children, adolescents, and adults engage in costly punishment to sanction fairness violations? Two studies investigated the differential impact of incidental anger on the costly punishment of 8-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and adults. Focusing on experimentally manipulated incidental anger allows for a causal investigation as to whether and how anger affects costly punishment in these age groups in addition to other motives such as inequity aversion. Study 1 (N = 210) assessed the effect of incidental anger (vs. a neutral emotion) on second-party punishment, where punishers were direct victims of fairness violations. Study 2 (N = 208) examined third-party punishment, where the punisher was an observer unaffected by the violation. Across ages, incidental anger increased the second-party punishment of unequal offers but not equal offers. Thus, anger seems to play a causal role in the punishment of unfairness when fairness violations are self-relevant. As predicted, adults' third-party punishment of unequal offers was higher in the incidental anger condition than in the neutral emotion condition. Children's third-party punishment of unfairness was not affected by the emotion condition, but incidental anger increased adolescents' third-party punishment across offers. Overall, our data suggest that the association between anger and costly punishment is based on the self-relevance of the violation. In third-party situations, where unfairness does not affect the self, social-cognitive processes that develop well into adulthood, such as emotional appraisals, might be necessary for third parties to engage in costly punishment.

The role of financial stress in mental health changes during COVID-19.

Using longitudinal data before and during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic for a representative sample of Dutch households, we examined the role of financial stress, defined as the subjective experience of lacking financial resources to cope with demands, in mental health changes. Also, we examined financial stress and mental health relations with households' income, savings, and debts. The data revealed that average mental health did not change during the first six months of the pandemic but showed considerable underlying heterogeneity. Results showed that financial stress changes significantly explained this heterogeneity. Increases in financial stress predicted decreases in mental health, whereas decreases in financial stress predicted increases in mental health. While income did not explain financial stress changes, fewer savings and more debts were related to increased financial stress, which was, in turn, negatively related to mental health. We discuss the implications of our findings for mental health care and financial security policy and provide suggestions for future research.

The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions.

In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).

Acute stress amplifies experienced and anticipated regret in counterfactual decision-making.

Previous research has shown that stress can affect emotion processing in a variety of settings. However, little attention has been paid to the effects of stress on emotional decision-making. The present study addressed this question by exposing healthy young participants either to a stressor (n = 30)-socially evaluated cold pressor task- or a non-stressful control task (n = 30). Subsequently, participants completed a computerized decision-making task in which they could compare the obtained factual outcome with a non-obtained counterfactual outcome. Saliva samples were taken at four time points over the course of the experiment and used to analyze cortisol levels. Results revealed that acute stress induced reliable salivary cortisol increase over the experimental task. At the outcome delivery stage, acute stress amplified negative emotions induced by the counterfactual comparison. At the choice stage, under stress, participants were more likely to make regret-averse decisions. The findings that acute stress amplifies both experienced and anticipated regret is consistent with dual process frameworks such that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.Lay summaryStress is thought to affect emotional processing. The present study investigated the effects of acute stress on emotional decision making using a typical counterfactual decision making task. Acute stress amplified both experience and anticipation of regret, consistent with the dual process frame that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.

Experimental Games and Social Decision Making.

Experimental games model situations in which the future outcomes of individuals and groups depend on their own choices and on those of other (groups of) individuals. Games are a powerful tool to identify the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal and group cooperation and coordination. Here we discuss recent developments in how experimental games are used and adapted, with an increased focus on repeated interactions, partner control through sanctioning, and partner (de)selection for future interactions. Important advances have been made in uncovering the neurobiological underpinnings of key factors involved in cooperation and coordination, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputations and (in)direct reciprocity. Emerging trends at the cross-sections of psychology, economics, and the neurosciences include an increased focus on group heterogeneities, intergroup polarization and conflict, cross-cultural differences in cooperation and norm enforcement, and neurocomputational modeling of the formation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.

Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality.

Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.

The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments.

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants' judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Power in economic games.

Economic games offer an analytic tool to examine strategic decision-making in social interactions. Here we identify four sources of power that can be captured and studied with economic games - asymmetric dependence, the possibility to reduce dependence, the ability to punish and reward, and the use of knowledge and information. We review recent studies examining these distinct forms of power, highlight that the use of economic games can benefit our understanding of the behavioral and neurobiological underpinnings of power, and illustrate how power differences within and between groups impact cooperation, exploitation, and conflict.

Surprise: unfolding of facial expressions.

Responses to surprising events are dynamic. We argue that initial responses are primarily driven by the unexpectedness of the surprising event and reflect an interrupted and surprised state in which the outcome does not make sense yet. Later responses, after sense-making, are more likely to incorporate the valence of the outcome itself. To identify initial and later responses to surprising stimuli, we conducted two repetition-change studies and coded the general valence of facial expressions using computerised facial coding and specific facial action using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Results partly supported our unfolding logic. The computerised coding showed that initial expressions to positive surprises were less positive than later expressions. Moreover, expressions to positive and negative surprises were initially similar, but after some time differentiated depending on the valence of the event. Importantly, these patterns were particularly pronounced in a subset of facially expressive participants, who also showed facial action in the FACS coding. The FACS data showed that the initial phase was characterised by limited facial action, whereas the later increase in positivity seems to be explained by smiling. Conceptual as well as methodological implications are discussed.

Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of Unethical Behavior Among Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers.

Occasional acts of immorality are commonplace. One way in which people deal with their own prior immoral acts, is to rationalize why their acts are morally acceptable. It has been argued that such post hoc moral rationalizations may contribute to continuation or escalation of immoral behavior. This paper experimentally tests this causal influence of post hoc moral argumentation on escalation of immoral behavior and also tests how this depends on people's level of moral identity. In three experiments we asked participants to generate moral arguments for their past behaviors. The results show that engaging in moral rationalization causes subsequent continuation and escalation of previous immoral behavior, but more so for low moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers.

The Color Red Is Implicitly Associated With Social Status in the United Kingdom and China.

Research and theorizing on human societies have shown that the color red plays a large role in human psychological functioning. The aim of the present study was to test the association between red and high-status symbols across cultural contexts. Using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) paradigm, across seven experiments (N = 357), we demonstrated that participants exhibited a faster association of red color and logos of high-status stimuli compared to red color and logos of low-status stimuli. The effect was shown among both males and females, with two different types of status symbols (car logos and university logos), and with four different contrast colors (white, gray, green, blue). Moreover, this association was observed in both United Kingdom and China. These findings provide compelling evidence for the implicit association between the color red and high social status across two different cultural contexts.

On the Counterfactual Nature of Gambling Near-misses: An Experimental Study.

Research on gambling near-misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses. The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non-obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the current paper, we investigate how different types of near-misses influence self-perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel-of-fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, n = 51; Experiment 2, n = 104), we demonstrate that near-wins (neutral outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self-perceived luck, whereas near-losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty) increased luck ratings. The effects of near-misses varied by near-miss position (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were more responsive to near-wins and near-losses on the wheel-of-fortune task. The effect of near-miss position was attenuated when the anticipatory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and losses, between "clear" and "narrow" outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near-misses.

Peers Influence Prosocial Behavior in Adolescent Males with Autism Spectrum Disorders.

Peer influence has a profound impact on decision-making in typically developing adolescents. In this study, we examined to what extent adolescent males (age 11-17 years; N = 144) with and without autism (ASD) were influenced by peer feedback on prosocial behavior, and which factors were related to individual differences in peer feedback sensitivity. In a public goods game, participants made decisions about the allocation of tokens between themselves and their group-in absence or presence of peer feedback. Adolescents with and without ASD were sensitive to peer feedback on prosocial behavior. More autism traits and social interest were associated with less sensitivity to antisocial feedback, suggesting that peer feedback creates opportunities for social adjustment in those with and without ASD.

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing.

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.

On sanction-goal justifications: How and why deterrence justifications undermine rule compliance.

Authorities frequently justify their sanctions as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. Although providing a sanction justification seems appealing and harmless, we propose that a deterrence justification decreases the extent to which sanctions are effective in promoting rule compliance. We develop a theoretical model that specifies how and why this occurs. Consistent with our model, 5 experiments demonstrated that-compared with sanctions provided without a justification or sanctions provided with a just-deserts justification-sanction effectiveness decreased when sanctions were justified as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. This effect was mediated by people feeling distrusted by the authority. We further demonstrated that (a) the degree to which deterrence fostered distrust was attenuated when the sanction was targeted at others (instead of the participant) and (b) the degree to which distrust undermined rule compliance was attenuated when the authority was perceived as legitimate. We discuss the practical implications for authorities tasked with promoting rule compliance, and the theoretical implications for the literature on sanctions, distrust, and rule compliance. (PsycINFO Database Record

When Do Low Status Individuals Accept Less? The Interaction between Self- and Other-Status during Resource Distribution.

In real-world social interactions, social status influences responses to resource distribution. However, the way in which one's own social status interacts with another's status to influence responses to resource distribution is far from clear. In the current study, we dynamically manipulated participants' social status and then asked participants to act as recipients in the ultimatum game (UG) along with proposers whose social status was made known to the participants. Experiment 1 used a between-participants design in which the participants were assigned as being of either high or low status according to their performance in a math competition (i.e., rank-inducing task). In Experiment 2, social status was manipulated within-subjects using the same rank-inducing task, with rounds of UG interleaved between rank-inducing sessions. Findings from the two experiments showed that both self-status and other-status influenced responses to UG offers, as participants were more likely to accept low offers from high status than low status proposers; this effect was particularly robust for low status participants when compared with high status participants. These findings suggest that, in comparison with individuals in high status, individuals in low status are more willing to accept low offers during resource distribution and are more affected by other-status considerations.